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Lichtenberg et al.: Reasonable Suspicion

TERRY AND BEYOND: TESTING THE UNDERLYING
ASSUMPTION OF REASONABLE SUSPICION
Illya D. Lichtenberg, Ph.D.'
Alisa Smith, J.D., Ph.D2
Michael Copeland, M.A., J.D.3
"It is, indeed, regrettable that the empirical data on a
subject such as this are sparse, but we need not ignore the data
which do exist simply because further refinement would be even
more helpful.' 4
INTRODUCTION
In Terry v. Ohio, 5 the United States Supreme Court carved
out an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements. The Court held that a police officer could
conduct an investigative stop of a citizen without a warrant and6
based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
The Court also held that same officer, based on a reasonable
suspicion that the citizen may be armed and dangerous, could
conduct a "pat-down" frisk of the citizen's outer clothing ("stop
1Illya Lichtenberg (Assistant Professor) received his B.S., M.A., J.D., and Ph.D.
degrees from Rutgers University. He teaches the Sociology of Law, Crime and
the Courts, Social Deviance, and Sociology of Police Work courses at Rutgers
University. Prof. Lichtenberg's research interests include racial profiling, the
Fourth Amendment, and individual and group responses to authority. He has
published, with Candace McCoy, an article, "Providing Effective Habeas
Counsel for Indigents in Capital Cases," JUSTICE SYSTEM 21:1 (1999). He also
has a forthcoming law review article, "Why Minorities Run from the Police,"
Rutgers Law Record, and two peer-reviewed articles, "How Dangerous Are
Routine Traffic Stops: A Research Note," JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (with
Alisa Smith), and "The Utility of Consent Searches as a Law Enforcement Tool:
Rates and Quantities," JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL (with Alisa Smith).
2 Dr. Smith holds a Ph.D. from Florida State University and is an Assistant
Professor of Criminal Justice at Seton Hall University.
3 Michael Copeland received his B.A. in Criminal Justice from Southeastern
Oklahoma State University, his J.D. from the University of Oklahoma, and is a
Doctoral Candidate at Rutgers University. He is now serving, as an Assistant
Professor in the Justice Studies Program.
4 Maryland

v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 n.2.(1997) (commenting on the need
for more data on police victimization).
5392 U.S 1 (1968).
6Id.at 30.
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and frisk").7 The Court's conclusion was a result of balancing
citizens' interests in being free from unwarranted police intrusions
against the interest in police officer protection.8 To support the
balance in favor of law enforcement safety, the Court found that
criminals armed with guns and knives historically harmed police
officers. 9 The Court relied on Uniform Crime Report data from
1960 to 1966 to support its belief that citizens subjected police to
great risk of violence. 10 The Court enumerated the number of
police officers killed in 1966, the number killed by guns, the
number killed by knives, the number assaulted and the number
injured in 1966, and the total killed since 1960.11 Thus, when the
Court held that "stop and frisks" were permissible, it did so based
on the assumption that the dangers presented justified the intrusion.
Since the 1968 decision in Terry, the assumption of the
danger of policing has become firmly rooted in American culture.
The media, politicians, and social scientists perpetuate the notion
that policing is a dangerous occupation.1 2 The assumption has not
been thoroughly examined empirically. In Terry and its progeny,
the Court has relied on unrefined statistics. These statistics as well
as the Court's mode of analysis are insufficient to establish that
policing is or is not dangerous. The simple frequency of homicides
and assaults does not sufficiently measure risk. It does not give a
rate of homicide or assault and there is no measure of "relative
risk." One method of clarifying the statistics and improving the
assessment of risk is to compare the rate of police victimization to
the risk of the general population.
This article will examine the Court's assumption of the
inherent danger to police using available homicide data and the
relative risk of police homicides to that of the general population
based on similar age and gender characteristics.
7id.
8 Id. at

27.

9 Id. at 20.

'0 Id.at 20, n.4.

"Terry, 320 U.S. at 20, n.4.
2 See Fridell and Pate, Death on Patrol:Killings of American Law Enforcement
Officers, in 3 CRITICAL ISSUES INPOLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 580-

608 (R. Dunham & G. Alpert eds., Waveland Press 1995); David Lester, The
Murder of Police Officers in American Cities, 11 CRIM. JusT. & BEHAV. 101
(1984).
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HISTORY OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
Any legal examination of search and seizure law must
necessarily begin with the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.1 3 It is the Constitution that provides the language
upon which further judicial refinement can be based. 14 The
framers clearly intended the Fourth Amendment to protect "the
people" from searches and seizures that were not reasonable.
Early interpretations of this Amendment held that the protection it
provided was realized by requiring a judicial officer, rather than a
police officer, to determine when the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right to search.
In Johnson v. United States,' 5 the Supreme Court succinctly
stated the importance of the Fourth Amendment's requirements:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out
16
crime.
The early decisions by the Court placed a great deal of
importance and emphasis on the necessity of obtaining a warrant
from a magistrate and the establishment of probable cause. While
the early Court did carve out limited exceptions for exigent
circumstances, the Court continued to enforce the general rule that
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV., which states in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.
Id.
14 Id.

" 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
16Id. at

13-14.
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a police officer needed to obtain a warrant or have probable cause
before searching a person or his or her belongings. 17 This view
continued to be the law of the land until8 1968 when the Supreme
Court decided the case of Terry v. Ohio.'
In Terry, a police officer in plain clothes observed three
men pacing in front of a store. 19 Based on the behavior of the three
men, the officer suspected that they were about to rob the store.2 °
The officer approached the three men and, after identifying
himself, began to ask them some questions. 2' After getting no
coherent answer from any of the three men, the police officer
became more suspicious and eventually patted down the outside of
the men's clothing. 2 Feeling a pistol under one of the men's coat,
seized weapons from two of the three and arrested
the officer
23
them.
At trial, the defense made a motion to suppress the gun as
fruit of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2 The
defense argued that neither probable cause nor a search warrant
supported the search.25 However, the trial court denied the motion
the
and allowed the gun into evidence. 26 Later, in a bench trial, 27
defendant Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
conviction. 28 For the first time the Court did not require probable
cause for an officer to make a warrantless search. Instead, the
Court held that a search might be conducted if "a reasonable
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others would be in danger.",29 The Court
17See

generally, R.W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 737, 739, 748-73 (1992).
" 392 U.S. at 6.
1

9 Id.

20

Id.at 7.

21

id.

22Id.

Teriy, 392 U.S. at 6-7.
Ohio v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 127, 214 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ohio Ct. App.
1966).
25
id.
26Id. at 123.
27 Terry, 392 U.S. at 8.
28Id.at 31.
29
Id. at 26.
23

24
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went on to explain that searches would be permissible if founded
on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that
30
intrusion.
In its reasoning, the Court balanced the interest of the
individual with the interests of the government. 31 In considering
the governmental interest, the Court stated:
We are now concerned with more than the governmental
interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is more immediate
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with32a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
Thus, in balancing the interest of the individual and the
government, the Court considered the danger inherent in policing.
In other words, the Court had to estimate how dangerous
"policing" was, and determines how much impact it should have
on the balancing test. In arriving at this estimation, the Court
found great risk in the routine activities of the police. 33 The Court
stated, "American criminals have a long tradition of armed
violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement
officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are
wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial
portion of
34
knives."
and
guns
with
inflicted
are
injuries
the
In support of this statement, the Court cited Uniform Crime
Report ("UCR") data for 1966. In footnote 21, the Court stated:
Fifty-seven law enforcement officers were killed in the line
of duty in this country in 1966, bringing the total to 335 for the
seven-year period beginning with 1960. Also in 1966, there were
23,851 assaults on police officers, 9,113 of which resulted in
injuries to the policemen. Fifty-five of the 57 officers killed in
1966 died from gunshot wounds, 41 of them inflicted by handguns
easily secreted about the
person. The remaining two murders were
35
perpetrated by knives.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20-21.
32 Id. at 20.
33 Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
31

34 Id.

31 Id. at 24, n.21.
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Thus, when the Court held that "stop and frisk" searches

(now called "Terry stops") would be permitted, they did so based
on the assumption that the dangers involved in policing justified
the intrusion. In doing so, the Court accepted "reasonable
suspicion" as the new threshold for a constitutional search.3 6
In Michigan v. Long 7 the Court extended Terry to include
a search of the interior of an automobile.38 In doing so, the Court
made numerous references to their concern for the safety of police
officers.3 9 The majority presented its concern for officer safety
when it stated:
Finally, we have also expressly recognized that
suspects may injure police officers and others by
virtue of their access to weapons, even though they
may not themselves be armed.... Our past cases
indicate then that protection of police and others can
justify searches when police have a reasonable
belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside
encounters between police and suspects are
especially hazardous, and that danger may arise
from the possible presence of weapons in the area
surrounding the suspect.4 °
In Terry, the Court had applied the reasonable suspicion
standard to on-the-street encounters with citizens. 4 1 In Long, the
Court extended the reasonable suspicion standard to motor vehicle
stops. 42 Seven years later, in Maryland v. Buie,43 the scope of
reasonable suspicion was expanded once again and applied to
3

6 Id. at 27.

37
38

463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

1Id. at 1051.

39

Id. at 1034 (reasserting the Terry standard when stating that police can justify
prospective searches when the police suspect that the person presents a potential
danger). Id. at 1052 (noting that the Michigan Supreme Court has held that
despite the fact that suspect was under police control it is not sufficient to render
police officers protective measures unreasonable). Id. at 1048 (traffic stops are
particularly dangerous to police officers); See also Bristow, Police Officer
Shootings - A TacticalEvaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.

93 (1963).
40 463 U.S. at 1048.
4 392 U.S. at 30.
42 463 U.S. at 1049.
4' 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
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searches of a private dwelling. This created a lesser standard of
proof needed to justify an extended "protective sweep." 4 The
issue of the officer's safety emerged again throughout the
decision.45 The Buie decision had applied reasonable suspicion to
the search of a person's home,
where the expectation of privacy
46
greater.
been
have
could not
Although Terry and its progeny were limited to a search for
weapons, later decisions expanded the scope. For example, after
Minnesota v. Dickerson47 police officers were no longer limited to
seize only items discovered during their search that they
reasonably suspected were contraband, even though the items may
have posed no threat, providing that the initial search was justified
on the grounds of Terry.48
The Court continued this "police safety" justification for
contracting the scope of the Fourth Amendment in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms. 49 In Mimms, the Court held that pursuant to a traffic stop
a police officer may order a driver out of a car, even if there is no
50
reason to believe that the driver poses a danger to the officer.
While the Court agreed that this was a seizure, though only a de
minimis intrusion, it found that the seizure was justified. 5' Thus,
the Court abandoned the long held rule that the inquiry into danger
was individualized, rather than general. Additionally, it no longer
required an articulable reason to suspect criminal activity or the
potential for violence to justify asking the driver to step out, and
subsequently leading to a "stop and frisk" search.52 The Court
explained this departure by stating, "[w]e think it too plain for
See Mark A. Cuthbertson, Comment, Marylandv. Buie: The Supreme Court's
Protective Sweep Doctrine Runs Rings Around the Arrestee, 56 ALB. L. REV.
159, 164-65 (1992).
45 Buie, 494 U.S. at 327-37.
46 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
(Harlan, J.,
concluding in a concurring opinion that a person has a reasonable expectation of
Trivacy in their home).
508 U.S. 366 (1993).
48 Id. at 373 (finding that a search of a jacket pocket exceeded the bounds of
Terry since the officer knew that the bulge was not a weapon, but suspected that
it was a crack pipe).
49 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
'old. at 111.
44

51 Id.
52

Id. at 108.
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argument that the State's proffered justification - the safety of the
officer - is both legitimate and weighty." 53
Most recently, in Maryland v. Wilson,54 the Court held that
police making a traffic stop may order a passengerto get out of the
car as well.55 In their reasoning, the Court continued to emphasize
the level of danger in policing. The Court noted that "traffic stops
may be dangerous encounters," and thus justified this intrusion
upon the passenger's autonomy. 56 Once again, the Court permitted
this seizure of a person, even though there was no reason to believe
that the passenger was in any way dangerous or engaged in
criminal activity.
Although. some of the Court's decisions have pointed
toward specific circumstances under which police officers may be
placed in danger of lethal violence, there is a continuing theme that
policing is dangerous. This is particularly evident in Mimms and
Wilson, where the Court allowed seizures when there were no
specific reasons to believe that the officer was in any danger. The
Court has made the assumption that life-threatening perils are a
regular part of police-citizen encounters.
SOMETHING TO MEASURE AGAINST?
"Risk" is a relative measure. The assumption that police
are subject to greater risk of lethal violence necessitates an
empirical comparison. One method of measuring relative risk is
by simply comparing the likelihood of lethal violence to police
against the risk faced by the average American. The rate of
homicide victimization in the general population cannot be
compared directly to the police population. Without statistical
adjustments, the two groups differ in important respects. The
comparison should be conducted with a similar or matching group
from within the general population. Once the comparative group is
identified, then a comparison of victimization rates may be
conducted. This will allow for a test of the Court's assumption

3 Id. at
'4

110.

519 U.S. 408 (1997).

" Id. at 415.
-' Id. at 413.
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that the profession of policing places officers at a far greater risk of
lethal violence than the general population.
THE LITERATURE ON POLICE HOMICIDE
The homicide victimization of police officers has been a
topic of research for criminologists for many years. The wide
range of topics receiving attention include demographic
characteristics of police victims, 57 situational characteristics of
59
police victimization, 58 geographical correlates of victimization,
the application of conflict theory to police
killings, 60 and numerous
61
other areas of criminological interest.
57 See Sean A. Grennan, Findings on the Role of Officer Gender in Violent

Encounters with Citizens, 15 J. OF POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 78 (1987); R. Reviere
and V. Young, Mortality of Police Officers: Comparisons by Length of Time on
the Force, 13 AM. J. OF POLICE 51 (1994); David Konstantin, Homicides of
American Law Enforcement Officers 1978-1980, 1 JUST. Q. 29 (1984); Terry
Edwards, Felonious Killings of State Police and Highway Patrol Officers: A
Descriptiveand ComparativeEvaluation, 14 AM. J. OF POLICE 89 (1994).
58 Joel Garner and Elizabeth Clermner, Danger to Police in Domestic
Disturbances- A New Look, in RESEARCH IN BRIEF (National Institute of Justice
ed., 1986); Albert P. Cardarelli, An Analysis of Police Killed by Criminal
Action: 1961-1963, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 447 (1968);
Robert Little, Cop Killing: A Descriptive Analysis of the Problem, 7 POLICE
STUD. 68 (1984); Charles Moorman et al., A Decade of Peace Officers
Murdered in California: The 1980's, 24 J. OF CAL. L. ENFORCEMENT 1 (1990);
Larry Roberts, An Analysis of Fatal Assaults Upon Law Enforcement Officers
Which Occurred in the United States From 1972 Through 1978 (1981)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern Mississippi) (on file
with author); John Stratton et al., Police in a Violent Society, 54 FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1985); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Police Murder in
Drug-Related Situations, 1972-88, in CRIME CONTROL INSTITUTE, CRIME
CONTROL REPORTS No. 7 (1989).

59 Max Boylen and Robert Little, Fatal Assaults on United States Law
Enforcement Officers, 63 POLICE J. 61 (1990); David Lester, PredictingMurder
Rates of Police Officers in Urban Areas, 7 POLICE L. Q. 20 (1978); Lester,
supra note 12.
60 Mitchell B. Chamlin, Conflict Theory and Police Killings, 10 DEVIANT
BEHAV. 353 (1989).
61 Laura A. Wilson and C. Kenneth Meyer, Violence at the Street Level: Police
Casualties and Fatalities, 64 POLICE J. 28 (1990); Freidrich Wenz, Death
Anxiety Among Law Enforcement Officers, 7 J. OF POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 230
(1979); Francis Cullen et al., Paradox in Policing: A Note on Perceptions of
Danger, 11 J. OF POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 457 (1983); James C. Hackler and
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Despite the extensive research on police homicide
victimization, comparative studies of relative risk are scant. The
few studies that exist come to divergent conclusions. Two notable
commentaries on homicide rates include "the homicide rate for
police is more than double that for the general population" 62 and
"most people reacting to this study's findings have been surprised
at how low the death toll is [for police officers]. 63 Other than the
preceding two seemingly contradictory comments on police
homicide victimization rates, little else can be found in the
criminological and criminal justice literature on the comparative
homicide victimization rates for police officers. The research that
does exist in the area of comparative homicide victimization rates
for police officers either fails to offer a comprehensive nationwide
look at homicide rates, fails to include police officers only, is not
current, or does not isolate homicide as a sole source of
victimization. 64 The gap in the homicide literature impedes the
Court's ability to make meaningful comparisons of police
victimization rates.
RESEARCH QUESTION
Prior research on the relative risk of police officer homicide
65
as compared to the general population may be misleading.
Christian T. L. Janssen, Police Killings in Perspective, 27 CAN. J. OF
CRIMINOLOGY 227 (1985); SAMUEL G. CHAPMAN, COPS, KILLERS AND STAYING
ALIVE: THE MURDER OF POLICE OFFICERS IN AMERICA (1986); William
Wilbanks, Cops Killed and Cop-Killers: An HistoricalPerspective, 13 AM. J. OF
POLICE 31 (1994); L. DYKSTRA, ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
ASSAULTED OR KILLED:
1972-1982 (1984); FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, KILLED IN THE LINE OF DUTY: A STUDY OF SELECTED
FELONIOUS KILLINGS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (1992); David Lester, A
Study of Civilian-caused Murders of Police Officers, 6 INT'L J. OF
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 373 (1978); M. MARGARITA, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST POLICE (1980); Ruth D. Peterson and William C. Bailey, Structural

Influences on the Killing of Police: A Comparison with General Homicides, 5
JUST. Q. 207 (1988).
62 Garner and Clemmer, supra note 58.
63 Sherman et. al., supranote 58.
64 KATHRYN RIEDMILLER ET AL., CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
SERVICES, CALIFORNIA OCCUPATIONAL MORTALITY 1979-81 (1987).
65 Garner and Clemmer, supra note 58.
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Studies that have found police at more than twice the risk of
homicide failed to make a comparison to the general population
with similar age and sex characteristics. 66 Victimization, as noted
in the literature, is not evenly distributed throughout the
population. 67
There are differences in the demographic
composition of the general population and the police population
that should be considered in comparing victimization rates.
Two variables that are strong predictors of the likelihood of
homicide victimization are sex and age. Since the majority of
police are male and age restrictions apply in almost all police
departments, it is necessary to control for these factors in making a
comparison. How each variable is controlled will be discussed at
length in the methodology section.
METHODOLOGY
All of the data sources used are pre-,ublished and most,
with the exception of the Strawbridge study,6 are commonly used
in the social sciences. Of specific concern to this research, prior to
making the comparisons, are validity threats to the data from two
sources: (1) the data collection itself and (2) integrating the data
sources for comparison.
DATA SOURCES
69
The data sources used were the Uniform Crime Reports
('UCR"), the Supplementary Homicide Reorts70 ("SHR"), Law
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted ("LEOKA"), United

66 Garner and Clenmer, supra note 58. This may have changed in the ten years
since this work was published, but disproportionality still exists.
67 Leonard Savitz, Official Statistics, in LEONARD SAVITZ AND NORMAN
JOHNSTON, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINOLOGY 12 (1982).
68 p. STRAWBRIDGE AND D. 'STRAWBRIDGE, A NETWORKING GUIDE TO
RECRUITMENT, SELECTION AND PROBATIONARY TRAINING OF POLICE OFFICERS
IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA (1990).
69 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES.
7oU.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS.
71 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND
ASSAULTED.
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States Census as it appears in the Statistical Abstract of the United
States 72 ("STATAB"), and a study conducted in the late nineteeneighties which surveyed the seventy-two largest police
departments in the United States. 73 Each of these data sources will
be examined for validity threats and for compatibility with other
data sources used.
POPULATION AND POLICE: GENDER DISTRIBUTION
Accounting for gender distributions in the two populations
required using different data sources. The STATAB was used for
the general population. The UCR was used to calculate the gender
distribution to police. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the large gender
differences in the police and general populations.74
Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix clearly demonstrate that
the two populations are quite different in gender distribution. The
police population is less than ten percent female in all years from
1986 through 1995, while the general population is more than
fifty- percent female during this same time period. A well-known
fact in criminology is that females are less likely to be the victim
of almost any type of violent crime. 75 This fact is quite evident in
the case of homicide. Figure 3 demonstrates these pronounced
gender differences in the homicide victimization rates of the
general population.76
Figure 3 supports the need to control for gender. The male
rate of homicide victimization is approximately three times greater
than the female victimization rate in each of the years examined.
The necessity to control for gender could not be made clearer
based upon the gender distributions of the two populations.77

72

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STASTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES.

73 STRAWBRIDGE, supra note

68.

74 See Appendix, Figures 1 and 2, infra at 460 and 461.
75 Rape is the only violent offense where females are more often victims than
males.
76 See Appendix, Figure 3, infrla at 462.
77 It would be interesting to note the differences between the female homicide
rate in the general population and that of female police officers, but such a study
will be reserved for a future analysis.
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POPULATION AND POLICE: AGE DISTRIBUTION
Obviously, children, infants and senior citizens are less
likely to become homicide victims.78 Although seniors, children
and infants become victims of homicide, the rate of victimization
is hardly comparable to that of young and middle age adult males.
To compensate for the age disparity between the male population
and male police officers, an estimate of the police age range was
necessary. The age distribution, unlike all the other police data,
was not provided in the UCR. The Strawbridge study was the only
source from which an age estimate could be derived. The
Strawbridge study examined the seventy-two largest police
departments in the United States. These police departments were
asked to provide answers to numerous questions - many
demographic - about their departments. Age specific questions
included (1) the average age at which police began service and (2)
the average number of years a police officer served. A third
question not directly related to age, but relevant to some extent,
was number of years of service before officers were eligible to
collect their pensions.79
Unfortunately, the Strawbridge study relied on the accuracy
of self reported information from the respondent police
departments and thus may not be a reliable measure. Questions
concerning the accuracy of the data include the fact that many
departments reported age in whole numbers while others reported
whole numbers with decimals. How each department determined
the ages of police officers in their departments is unknown. It is
possible that a police department relied on nothing more than
guessing, thus the scope of this potential validity threat is
unknown. Absent another source from which to estimate the age
distribution of police officers, the Strawbridge study remained the
only source from which an age estimate could be drawn.

78 See

SHR in CRIME INTHE UNITED STATES, sec. 1. Tables break down the age

of the victim in five-year aggregates.
79 This may be an irrelevant question because many police officers retire long
before their required amount of service and receive full or near full benefits
during "buy outs." Police officers may also retire early by applying credit for
military service to their pension or disability.
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Difficulties in calculating the age estimate were
compounded further when it was found that some departments
supplied no information concerning age, and others answered only
some of the questions. This made a formal estimation of the age
distribution of police officers very difficult. A fourth variable was
created for those departments that answered the two questions of
average age that officers began police service and the average
length of service. Adding the age at which service began to the
average years of service created the variable, this became the
"average exit age." Creating an average exit age was possible for
slightly more than fifty percent of the police departments. This left
very few options from which to make a-precise measurement of the
age range, so the data were simply estimated for an age range that
would capture the majority of police officers. 80The age range was
determined to be between twenty and fifty-four.
The next step was to control for age in the general
population of males from Figure 1 to allow a comparative match
with the police age range estimate of twenty to fifty-four. The
isolation of males age twenty to fifty-four in the general population
was drawn from the STATAB. The homicide victimization rate in
the population of males age twenty to fifty-four was the final
population that was compared to male police officers.
POPULATION AND POLICE: HOMICIDE RATES
The two male populations having been made equivalent for
age and gender, the next step was to modify the homicide
victimization rates for each population so the two rates were
comparable. For this the SHR and LEOKA were used. Validity
questions are also addressed.
POPULATION HOMICIDE RATE
The UCR and SHR which both appear in the same
publication have very different measures of homicide. The UCR
provides an estimated total number of homicide victimizations in
so A similar figure was used for determining the age of police officers in Canada.
Hackler and Janssen, supra note 61, at 230 (using twenty to forty-nine as the
police age range in making a similar comparison).
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the United States for a given year. The estimate is based upon the
number of Return A Counts 8 ' and for those Return A Counts that
are missing or submitted late. The estimate is
based upon the
82
previous year's homicide rate and current trends.
The SHR does not estimate. It publishes the data submitted
by police agencies. If an SHR is not submitted by the investigating
agency for a known homicide, then the homicide is omitted from
the published SHR statistics. No attempt is made to compensate
for the missing SHRs. A file of SHRs submitted beyond the
deadline is maintained by the UCR, but the statistics are never
published.83
The importance of the SHR's accuracy is that the UCR
estimate does not supply demographic characteristics of victim,
offender or situational and contextual information concerning the
homicide as the SHR does. The resulting question is how many
SHRs are not submitted for known homicides? Figure 4 illustrates
the disparity between the SHRs submitted and the UCR estimate
for the years 1983 through 1992.'
The differences between the UCR homicide estimate and
the SHR in total reported homicides averages approximately ten
percent per year. This means that approximately one in every ten
homicides known to the police is not captured in the SHR though
this varies considerably from year to year. Researchers to date
85
have not taken this threat to the statistic's validity seriously.
Estimating for the missing SHRs is difficult because much of the
information is compiled too late to classify in the SHR. Some
researchers suggest that the missing homicides are probably
dissimilar to those reported in a timely fashion,8 because
the victim
6
strangers.
be
to
likely
more
are
and the offender
8'Return A Counts are confirmed homicides reported to the UCR by May of the
following year.
82 Marc Reidel, Nationwide Homicide Data Sets: An Evaluation of the Uniform
Crime Reports and the National Center for Health Statistics Data, in

at 177-80 (Layton,
Baunch and Roberg eds., 1990).
83 This was based on several discussions with UCR statisticians.
8
4See Appendix, Figure 4, infra at 463.

MEASURING CRIME: LARGE SCALE, LONG-RANGE EFFORTS

85 Michael G. Maxfield, Circumstances in Supplementry Homicide Reports:
8Variety and Validity, 27:4 CRIMINOLOGY 671, 686 (1989).

6 Reidel, supra note 80; Maxfield, supra note 82.
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This places the researcher in a difficult position: either
accept the fact that ten percent of the data is missing and thus
under-represent victimizations, or estimate the missing SHRs
based on the SHRs submitted, which are by their very nature
assumed to be different from those reported. 8 ' In either case, the
result is a biased estimate. For this research, the published data
were used. It seemed more appropriate to utilize information
known to be accurate, rather than to estimate missing cases from
an unknown population of victims believed to be different from the
known population. The research continues with the population
homicide victimization rate estimate somewhere in the range of ten
percent below its actual rate.
MIXING THE UCR/SHR AND
VALIDITY PROBLEMS

THE STATAB:

MORE

Using the STATAB for the total population, gender
distribution and age distribution causes difficulties in making
This difficulty arises because the sources of
comparisons.
victimization data, the UCR/SHR, do not account for the entire
United States population 88 while the STATAB does. Since all
police departments were not part of the UCR reporting system, and
the characteristics and rates of victimization in these missing
departments jurisdictions remain unknown, the base population in
the STATAB is larger than the base population from which
victimization data is drawn. Since the characteristics of these
missing jurisdictions from the UCR are unknown, it is difficult to
draw inferences about the victimization rates. The individual rates
could differ from the overall victimization rate of the United
this problem by
States. However, census disparities may 8offset
9
population.
States
United
the
undercounting

87

Savitz, supra note 67.

88 CRIME INTHE UNITED STATES at 1 (1992).

89 See RICHARD E. BARRETT, USING THE 1990 U.S. CENSUS FOR RESEARCH

(1994).
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LEOKA
The homicide of a police officer comes to the attention of
LEOKA from three sources. 90 This reporting process results in a
measurement of homicide victimization that is unparalleled in
criminology. Both the small number of victims and the three
methods of reporting provide an excellent measure of
victimization. The validity of LEOKA in terms of under-reporting,
as evidenced by the SHR data, is not a major concern. Overreporting, however, poses a potential validity threat. The primary
validity concerns reflect LEOKA's comparability to the SHR data.
The validity problems of LEOKA are worth addressing.
The first involves what LEOKA measures. LEOKA specifically
measures felonious killings of police officers in the line of duty. 91
This measurement criterion raises two issues. What is a felonious
killing and does the definition match that of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter as used by the SHR? Further, what is a
line of duty killing and how many are not line of duty deaths?
No published sources provide a definition for a "felonious
killing." The summaries and descriptions of each officer's killing
in the line of duty, however, enable the inference that the definition
includes negligent manslaughter. The title "feloniously killed"
also appears to give a similar indication because negligent
manslaughter is a felony. Including negligent manslaughter in the
calculation may inflate the number of police officers killed. Since
only a few civilians become the victims of negligent
manslaughter,92 any error would favor a finding that police have
90 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED
AND ASSAULTED 1 (1991).

91 See supra note 87.
92 There is no data available on negligent manslaughter in the federal UCR.

Several states offer data on negligent manslaughter, for example, New York and
Colorado, but it was impossible to gain information on nationwide statistics for
negligent manslaughter. For example, in New York State in 1995 there were
1,656 reported murders, non-negligent manslaughters, and negligent
manslaughters. Of the 1,656 felonious killings, only 105 were negligent
manslaughters.
Negligent manslaughters reflect approximately 6.3% of
felonious killings. If the police statistics were inflated by 6.3%, this would
create a larger disparity between the police and population statistics which are
being compared. See 1995 CRIME AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT at 2 (Part I
Tally of Offenses).
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higher victimization rates than the general population. Any
disparity, however, would be slight.
LEOKA also does not provide a definition for "Line of
Duty" deaths. A UCR statistician was contacted to determine the
scope of deaths committed in the "Line of Duty." The omission of
some homicides while "off duty" would under-represent the
statistic. The UCR statistician reported that the felonious killing of
an off-duty police officer that was acting in any official police
capacity would be considered a line-of-duty death. "Any official
capacity" included an off-duty officer reaching for his firearm or
giving directions to a motorist. The definition provided was broad,
and it could encompass almost any homicide victimization. Many
police officers and departments consider their officers to be onduty twenty-four hours per day. In addition, the simple fact that
the police investigate the homicide victimization of their own, or in
cooperation with another law enforcement agency of common
alliance, it seems unlikely that many police officer homicides
would be considered
not in-the-line-of-duty and omitted from
93
LEOKA statistics.
LEOKA, unlike the SHR, includes the homicides of police
officers on assignment outside of the United States and in United
States territories. The SHR does not include the homicides of
civilians in either United States territories or outside of the nation.
Although a state-by-state breakdown of homicides includes Puerto
Rico, when all the state homicide victimization rates are added
together, it is revealed that Puerto Rico is not included in the
Nationwide homicide estimate nor in the SHR. This compromises
the research because homicides of policemen are measured in a
broader geographical area than that of the civilian population. To
control for this limitation, those police officers who were the
victim of a homicide either on assignment outside of the United
States or victimized in a United States territory were excluded
from the analysis. How this effects the overall number of police
officers who fell victim to a homicide is shown in Figure 5.94

93 One consideration is that police officers' families receive benefits for line-of-

duty deaths, which may be an important and influential factor in the
categorization of an officer death.
94 See Appendix, Figure 5, infra at 464.
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Since policing and homicide victimization remains maledominated, the next step was to remove female police officer
homicide victimization from the police total. Homicide summaries
for each female victim were then compared to all police officers
killed outside of the United States to prevent "double counting" or
"double exclusion" from occurring. Only one such circumstance
was found in this research, where the murder occurred in Puerto
Rico.
The final homicide victimization rates per 100,000 police
officers used in the final comparison are reported in Figure 6. This
calculated number represents all male police officers feloniously
killed in the "Line of Duty" in the United States.
ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Answering the research question required one simple step:
compare the two rates of victimization in one table and observe the
differences. Figure 6 shows the comparison of the homicide
victimization rates for the male police officers and male civilians
age twenty to fifty-four from 1986 through 1995."5
FINDINGS
The findings for the ten years studied are clear. In none of
the ten years did male police officers have a higher rate of
homicide victimization than males age twenty to fifty-four in the
general population. In some years the difference was quite small,
e.g., 0.1% in 1987. In others the difference was significant. In
1991 the male civilian homicide victimization rate was 0.1 % short
of double the police homicide victimization rate, and in 1992 the
male civilian homicide victimization rate more than doubled that
of the police. Although in more recent years the disparity has
lessened, these findings are clear contradictions of the views
expressed by the Court.

95 See Appendix, Figure 6, infra at 465.
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LIMITATIONS
There are three significant limitations to this research and
its findings. First, homicide is only a single indicator of "danger"
to the police. It is possible that other indicators, such as assaults,
may actually have increased over this same time period. Assault
also may be a more accurate measure of "danger" than homicide.
However, assault was not included in this research due to the
methodological difficulties surrounding the collection of that data.
Second, it may be argued that this analysis might not
adequately quantify risk. Since the Court focuses on the danger
related to the police-citizen encounter, a workplace analysis,
focusing on those occupations with the greatest exposure to the
public, may be more appropriate. To assess the relative risk of
"workplace" violence, the assessment should measure a worker's
exposure to risk by employment. 96 In essence, a comparison of the
rate of police homicides (by the number of police employed) to
other service-oriented occupation homicides (by the number of
employees) would measure this risk. 97 This type of analysis
should be pursued in the future to fine-tune the relative risk of
lethal (and non-lethal) violence to the police.
Third, this study does not examine data pre- and postTerry. Thus, this examination does not test the assumption about
officer safety without the current protections afforded police
officers by the Court. Such an analysis would allow for an
examination of the impact of Terry (and its progeny) on police
officer safety. This study would improve our understanding of
police danger as well as the effectiveness of the protections
permitted by the Court.
CONCLUSION
Based on this analysis, male police officers are not placed
at risk of homicide victimization, either on or off duty, beyond that
9

6 JOHN

OF

W. RUSER, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, A RELATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

WORKPLACE

FATALITIES,

FATAL WORKPLACE

INJURIES

IN

1993:

A

COLLECTION OF DATA AND ANALYSIS 18 (1995) (comparing the most dangerous
industries
with the average risk of fatality).
97
RUSER, supra note 91, at 22.
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which male citizens in a similar age grouping face daily. The
victimization rates between the two groups are very similar, and in
fact it appears reasonable to conclude that police officers have a
lower risk of homicide victimization than do the aggregate of
males in a similar age grouping. This finding contradicts the
assumption in Terry and its progeny that police face greater risk
than the general population. Despite the admitted limitations to
this research, it appears that the Supreme Court may be overzealous in its protection of police officers. The Court's legal
analyses may result in unwarranted intrusion upon the liberty
interest of individuals based upon an erroneous assumption that
policing is dangerous.
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APPENDIX

FIGURE 1.0
POPULATION BY SEX
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FIGURE 2.0
POLICE BY SEX

100

80
60
40
20

t

U

03

" 19'8619'8719'88198919901991 1992199319941995
--- MALE

--

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001

FEMALE

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [2001], Art. 6

462

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 17

FIGURE 3.0
SEX BY HOMICIDE RATE PER 100,000
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FIGURE 4.0
HOMICIDE ESTIMATE AND SHR
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FIGURE 6.0
POLICE/CIVILIAN: HOMICIDE PER 100,000
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